by Claude Opus 5.5
Can online outrage be a legitimate form of accountability when formal institutions have failed? What are its characteristic vices?
Much of what has happened in the case behind these seminars since September 2026 has been driven by online outrage. A civil complaint and a student newspaper investigation provided material; social media turned it into a national story; within two weeks the case had been reopened and handed to a special prosecutor. Many people see this as proof that public anger works when institutions fail. Others see the misidentification and harassment of an innocent man, and the naming of seven people before any charge, as proof that online outrage is a dangerous substitute for justice. Both reactions capture something. The question is whether outrage can be legitimate accountability, and what distinguishes its legitimate from its vicious forms.
The case for outrage
Anger at injustice is not a defect. P. F. Strawson argued that reactive attitudes such as resentment and indignation are part of what it is to treat others as responsible agents. Indignation on behalf of others expresses the judgement that a wrong has been done and that it matters. Amia Srinivasan has defended the “aptness” of anger: anger can be a fitting response to real injustice even when it is strategically unwise, and telling the wronged to calm down can itself be a way of silencing them.
Outrage also has practical value. Institutions respond to costs, and public attention imposes them. Sexual misconduct cases have historically been handled quietly, sometimes to protect institutions and powerful individuals. Collective public pressure has, in a number of cases, forced reviews, resignations and reforms that internal processes failed to produce. When formal accountability has failed, informal accountability may be the only kind available.
In this case, outrage arguably exposed genuine questions about how the original decision was made, prompted an outside review and may yet improve how such cases are handled. If those questions were warranted, outrage did something institutions should have done themselves.
Its characteristic vices
Online outrage also has vices that recur so consistently that they seem built into the medium.
Inaccuracy. Outrage moves faster than verification. Claims spread before they are checked, and corrections rarely catch up. The misidentification in this case is a stark example.
Disproportion. Online crowds have no mechanism for calibrating response to wrongdoing. A person can receive thousands of hostile messages regardless of the seriousness of what they did, or whether they did it at all. Jon Ronson’s studies of public shaming document lives destroyed by disproportionate responses to minor offences.
Misdirection. Anger aimed at an institution easily spills onto individuals, including those only loosely connected to the wrong: members of the fraternity who were not present, family members of the accused, or people with similar names.
Lack of finality. Formal processes end; online judgement does not. Search results, screenshots and archived posts keep a person tied to an accusation indefinitely, regardless of later outcomes.
Selection effects. Outrage attaches to cases that are dramatic, involve prestigious institutions or fit existing narratives. Equally serious cases that lack these features receive none. Outrage therefore distributes accountability unevenly.
Self-regard. Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke have described “moral grandstanding”: public moral talk aimed at enhancing one’s own reputation rather than at addressing the wrong. Grandstanding pushes discourse towards extremity, as people compete to show how strongly they condemn.
Amplification by design. Research by Molly Crockett and others suggests that social media platforms amplify moral outrage, because outrage generates engagement, and engagement is rewarded. The intensity of online anger may thus reflect platform incentives as much as the gravity of the underlying wrong.
Distinguishing legitimate from vicious outrage
These considerations suggest criteria for when outrage can serve as legitimate accountability.
Its target is institutional. Outrage directed at institutions, demanding that they explain and justify decisions, is more likely to be legitimate than outrage directed at individuals, demanding that they be punished.
It demands reasons, not results. Legitimate accountability asks officials to give an account; it does not demand a particular verdict. Outrage that insists on charges, expulsions or convictions regardless of evidence becomes a substitute for adjudication.
It is accurate. Outrage that rests on verified facts and acknowledges uncertainty is more defensible than outrage that spreads unverified claims.
It is proportionate and bounded. Legitimate pressure stops when its object has been achieved, such as a review, and leaves room for the outcome. Vicious outrage escalates and never ends.
It protects third parties. Legitimate outrage takes care not to harm people who are not responsible.
Applying the criteria
On these criteria, the outrage in this case has been mixed. Insofar as it demanded that the prosecutor, the university and the police explain their handling of the complaint, it served a legitimate function, and the reopening and special prosecutor are, in part, its achievements. Insofar as it named, shamed and harassed individuals before any charge, and caught an innocent man in its spread, it displayed the medium’s characteristic vices.
Conclusion
Online outrage can be a legitimate form of accountability when it targets institutions, demands reasons rather than results, rests on accurate information and remains proportionate. Its characteristic vices of inaccuracy, disproportion, misdirection, permanence, uneven selection, grandstanding and algorithmic amplification make those conditions hard to meet. The task is not to suppress anger at injustice but to channel it towards the institutions that can answer it, and away from individuals who cannot fairly be judged by a crowd.