by Claude Opus 5.5
What would justice for the complainant look like? For the accused? Is there a single outcome that delivers both?
The case behind these seminars is often discussed as if justice for the complainant and justice for the accused were opposed: whatever helps one must harm the other. That framing is understandable, because the parties’ accounts conflict. But it obscures the structure of the question. Justice is not a single good to be allocated between two people. It has several dimensions, some of which can be delivered to both parties at once, and some of which depend on facts that no one can yet be certain of.
What justice for the complainant might involve
Kathleen Daly, drawing on research with victims of sexual violence, has identified several “justice needs” that victims commonly report.
Participation: being informed about and involved in the process.
Voice: being able to tell one’s story and have it heard.
Validation: having one’s account taken seriously and the harm acknowledged.
Vindication: having the wrong publicly affirmed as a wrong, so that the community stands with the victim.
Offender accountability: seeing the person responsible acknowledge or answer for what they did.
To these one might add safety, support, and the ability to continue one’s life and education. In this case, the complainant’s lawsuit and public statements by her lawyer suggest that many of these needs have not been met: her account was summarised in terms she disputes, the original decision not to charge rested on that summary, and the university’s outcome, at least for one respondent, has been widely criticised as inadequate.
What justice for the accused might involve
The accused have their own claims.
The presumption of innocence: not being treated as guilty before guilt is established.
A fair hearing: knowing the allegations, seeing the evidence and being able to respond.
Accuracy: having the facts determined correctly.
Proportionality: if found responsible, receiving consequences that fit what they did, individually.
Finality and repair: if cleared, being able to move on, and having their reputation restored as far as possible.
In this case, the accused have been publicly named before any criminal charge, treated collectively in public discourse despite reportedly different findings, and face a reopened process two years after the events.
Procedural justice can be shared
Some dimensions of justice are not zero-sum. A thorough, accurate investigation serves both parties. A full record of the first account protects both. Impartial decision-makers, clear explanations, timely decisions and respectful treatment are owed to each, and providing them to one does not take them from the other. Procedural justice, in Tom Tyler’s sense of voice, neutrality, respect and trustworthiness, can in principle be delivered to both at once.
Substantive justice depends on the facts
Other dimensions depend on what actually happened. If the complainant was assaulted as she alleges, substantive justice for her requires that those responsible be held accountable, and that outcome would also be just for them, because it is what they deserve. If the allegations are false or mistaken in important respects, substantive justice for the accused requires that they be cleared, and that outcome would not be an injustice to the complainant, though it would be painful. In either case, there is in principle a single outcome that is just to both: the one that corresponds to the truth.
The difficulty is epistemic. We do not know, with certainty, what happened, and any process will err sometimes. Rawls called the criminal trial a case of “imperfect procedural justice”: there is an independent standard for the correct outcome, but no procedure guarantees reaching it. The question is then not whether a single outcome can deliver justice to both, but how to distribute the risk of error. Standards of proof are the tool for that, and they inevitably favour one party’s interest in avoiding one kind of error.
What a just overall outcome might look like
A just overall outcome would therefore combine several elements: a fair process that both parties can recognise as fair; an outcome that tracks the evidence as accurately as possible; acknowledgement to the complainant of what the evidence supports, and support regardless of the legal outcome; protection of the accused from consequences beyond what is established; and, wherever institutions failed, acknowledgement and reform. Such an outcome might not satisfy either party fully, but it would honour what each is owed.
Conclusion
Justice for the complainant involves participation, voice, validation, vindication and accountability; justice for the accused involves the presumption of innocence, a fair hearing, accuracy and proportionality. Procedural justice can be delivered to both at once. Substantive justice depends on facts, and in principle the truthful outcome is just to both; in practice, uncertainty means that any process distributes the risk of error. The best available approximation is a process both parties can recognise as fair, conducted by institutions willing to acknowledge their own failures.